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**Memorandum for:**

This is an updated copy of Talking Points for the DCI.

EUR M83-10282

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**E U R A**

**Office of European Analysis  
Directorate of Intelligence**

5 December 1983

## Spain: Talking Points for the DCI

Felipe Gonzalez and his Socialist Party won a landslide victory in the legislative elections in 1982 (202 of 350 seats) by campaigning on a centrist platform that drew support from moderate constituents. After a year in power, Gonzalez shows every sign of holding to the moderate course he charted shortly after taking office. Many of the Socialists' domestic goals -- curbing terrorism, strengthening public education, reorganizing the military, and completing the regional autonomy process -- involve long term programs, and Madrid is tackling them slowly and deliberately. [REDACTED]

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In dealing with Spain's economic problems, the Socialists are following conservative policies aimed at lifting the economy out of a five-year slump. Madrid reckons that if it can achieve an average rate of real GDP growth of about 3 percent over the next three years, it can make some headway in lowering its 17-percent unemployment rate. The high level of unemployment may prompt calls by the Communists and some labor unions to reflate the economy, but we think Gonzalez is strong enough to resist. Since exports must provide most of the impetus for economic growth, Madrid has focused its export promotion campaign on the US rather than Western Europe, where only an anemic recovery is likely. US protective measures against Spanish exports are thus likely to draw more critical attention than in the past. Meanwhile, the Minister of Economics and Finance has blamed US monetary policy for high Spanish interest rates and sagging investment in order to deflect criticism away from domestic policies. In fact, Madrid began to boost interest rates last year as a means of stimulating capital inflows, promoting saving, and reducing inflation. [REDACTED]

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Foreign policy is still in flux. Gonzalez emphasizes that Spain is in the Western camp, but he also places somewhat more emphasis on independence than previous Spanish leaders. The government is negotiating membership in the EC, and wrestling with its status vis-a-vis NATO. Gonzalez acted on his campaign pledge and froze NATO military integration pending a referendum on the issue. He now appears inclined to remain in NATO, but faces the difficult task of convincing the majority of Spaniards who remain wary of membership. Gonzalez has made clear that failure to get into the EC would make it extremely difficult to sell NATO in Spain. Latin America and the Middle East are areas of special concern to the Socialists for historical and ideological reasons. Gonzalez's analysis of the situation in Central America differs somewhat from the US, but his public criticism is tempered by his strong desire to maintain smooth relations with the United States. Although the Spanish are pro-Arab, they are looking for a way to establish relations with Israel. [REDACTED]

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The Prime Minister still retains a relatively large base of support, but there are signs that the honeymoon with his traditional rivals may be coming to an end. Since September, the government has clashed with the Church over abortion and education reform, heard grumblings from the military over continuing terrorism and government meddling in military affairs, and faced some unrest from farmers and workers (mostly Communist inspired). None of the problems are insurmountable, but they signal increased trouble ahead for a government that so far has led a charmed existence. [ ]

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INF

1. The Socialist government avoided comment on the INF issue until last May, when Prime Minister Gonzalez visited Bonn and publicly supported deployment.

- Gonzalez's remarks were made in return for Kohl's agreement to support Spanish entry into the EC.
- In recent weeks both Gonzalez and Foreign Minister Moran have reaffirmed their "understanding" of the decision to deploy new missiles, with Moran adding that the current disequilibrium favors the Soviet Union. [ ]

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Status of Relations with NATO

1. Despite the Socialists' opposition to NATO during the election campaign, Gonzalez has slowly come to appreciate the political and military benefits of membership and personally favors continued Spanish participation. However, he must overcome substantial political obstacles before the government can reaffirm Spanish membership in NATO. Participation in NATO's integrated military command is a more remote prospect.

- The Spanish electorate is largely uninformed about NATO and Western defense issues, and a substantial proportion of Socialist party members oppose ties to the Alliance. We believe Gonzalez and Vice Prime Minister Guerra are pursuing a policy of deliberate ambiguity on relations with NATO, both to buy time and to enable the government to conduct an educational campaign prior to the long-promised referendum.
- The first test of Gonzalez's ability to sway his party's opinion will come in October 1984 with the Socialist Party congress. He expects strong opposition from party members.
- Next, the Prime Minister will face the referendum on NATO, which will not be held until at least mid-1985. There are signs that Gonzalez may try to blur the issue by phrasing the referendum question in an ambiguous way. In any event, he probably will not confront the issue of military integration. Gonzalez has said the essential issue is membership, and he apparently believes military integration can evolve over time. [ ]

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2. We think Gonzalez's ability to turn the public and his party around on NATO will depend in part on where Spain's application to the EC stands at the time of the referendum.

- Talks have dragged on for four years and further negotiations have become linked to EC efforts to reform Community spending on agriculture and the EC budget in general.
- The linkage of Spain's NATO membership to its drive for EC membership presents problems for the US. For the past two years, some EC members have maintained that because it is in the US interest to have Spain in NATO and the EC, Washington should forego compensation demands for any loss of trade incurred as a result of Spain's entry into the EC.
- The political will exists within the EC to bring Spain into the Community, but even a prolonged delay could damage Spain's ties to NATO. We believe that in the unlikely event Spain fails to get into the EC, Gonzalez might consider withdrawing from NATO.

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#### Gibraltar

3. The UK-Spanish dispute over the sovereignty of Gibraltar is also a factor in the NATO and EC equation.

- Gonzalez linked progress on Gibraltar with NATO membership early in his tenure, trying to bring Allied pressure on Britain to resume negotiations.
- The Thatcher government says that Spain cannot join the EC unless it removes all restrictions on movement between Spain and the Rock.
- The Spanish are reluctant to lift restrictions either without a guarantee that Britain will negotiate the issue of sovereignty, or before Spain joins the Community. Once in the EC, the restrictions will have to be removed.
- Resolution of the sovereignty question is unlikely in the short term, but the two governments appear to be on warmer terms recently and have set up committees of experts to discuss the areas of disagreement. The talks may provide a face-saving way for Spain to open the border, thus removing one of the sticking points in the EC negotiations.

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#### Central America

1. Cultural, linguistic, and historical ties make Latin America an area of special concern to Spaniards.

- Both the right and left in Spain desire expanded cultural and commercial links to the region.

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- In addition, the Socialists' ideologically-rooted beliefs lead them to also champion human rights and national liberation movements. They believe that a more assertive Spanish-speaking bloc of nations can help end bipolarity in international politics and ease East-West tensions. [redacted]

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2. Central America has proved a vexing problem for Gonzalez, who had hoped to play a more active role in the region both to bolster support at home for his government and to burnish his credentials as an international statesman.

- Most Spaniards believe the conflicts in the area stem more from indigenous social and economic inequalities than from foreign intervention.
- The government's interest in the area stems largely from Gonzalez's participation in the Socialist International. In addition to numerous visits to the region, Gonzalez played an intermediary role in 1981 between then Secretary of State Haig and various regional leftist groups.
- Gonzalez has called for the withdrawal of both US and Cuban military advisers and has given strong support to the Contadora peace initiative.
- The government still formally supports the Sandinistas but Gonzalez has a realistic appreciation of the situation in Nicaragua. [redacted]

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- Moreover, recent revelation of Basque terrorist links to the Sandinistas has created public pressure in Spain for a weakening of ties to Managua. Gonzalez reportedly may move in that direction, but he will want to avoid the impression of being stampeded by foreign and domestic pressure. We therefore doubt that he will move until the current publicity dies down. [redacted]

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3. We doubt that Spain's involvement in Central American affairs will go much beyond the rhetorical level.

- Gonzalez recognizes that an overly ambitious diplomacy could invite embarrassment. For example, he will not offer to serve as a mediator unless all the parties involved in the conflicts agree.
- He also does not want to damage Spain's carefully cultivated relations with the US. After publicly criticizing US policy during a visit to Latin America this spring, Gonzalez suggested publicly and privately that he would avoid getting in Washington's way in the region. [redacted]

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
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Terrorism


1. Many observers in Spain thought that the new Socialist government would be better qualified than its predecessors to resolve the country's terrorist problem, which revolves largely around the Basque terrorists' (ETA) 24-year-old campaign for independence from Spain.

- The assumption was that only the Socialists, who sympathized with the anti-Franco motives of the pre-1975 ETA, could successfully negotiate with the terrorists.
- Gonzalez fed these hopes indirectly by citing resolution of the Basque problem as one of his government's top priorities.




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2. The optimism was soon shattered by stepped up terrorist violence that led the Socialist government to launch an all out offensive against ETA.

- Basque Regional President Carlos Garaicoechea's attempt to bring all parties together -- the Socialists, the Basque Regional Party (PNV), and terrorist-linked Herri Batasuna (HB) -- failed when HB refused to participate unless there was live press coverage of the proceedings.
- Garaicoechea tried to revive the discussions, but the Socialists demanded a cease fire by with ETA before talking.
- ETA responded with more violence, and Garaicoechea -- lambasting both the Socialists' alleged intransigence and ETA's provocations -- withdrew his offer. 

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3. The government in the meantime has enjoyed some notable successes against ETA, but the recent killing of a kidnapped Army captain, following the murders of three civilians, has raised new questions about the effectiveness of the government's program.

- Massive demonstrations were held throughout Spain opposing terrorism and calling for tougher government action.
- Tension in the military was reportedly high over the incident. The military has been grumbling louder recently about the ineffectiveness of the government's program but, when pressed, admits the government is doing about as much as it can. The government is hampered by legal restrictions and lack of support from the Basque regional government (which faces regional elections next year) and France (which is a safehaven for the terrorists). 

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4. Recognizing that repeated terrorist attacks against the military could spur some officers to take matters into their own hands, the government has just announced some stiffer measures.

- Interior Minister Barronuevo asked the courts to be more aggressive in prosecuting terrorist-related offenses, including harboring, protecting, defending, or in any way showing favoritism toward terrorist organizations.
- The government has beefed up security at prisons where terrorists are held.
- Security has been improved for armed forces personnel and installations.
- Madrid is also likely to renew efforts to tighten movement across the French border to prevent Basque terrorists from taking sanctuary so easily.

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**Memorandum for:**

This memorandum was prepared  
in preparation for Prime  
Minister Trudeau's visit to  
Washington on 15 December 1983.



16 December 1983

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**E U R A**

**Office of European Analysis  
Directorate of Intelligence**

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*EORM 83-10282*



14 December 1983

## MEMORANDUM

Canada: Trudeau's Peace InitiativeSummary

Prime Minister Trudeau says his peace initiative is designed to give a "jolt of political energy" to disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Trudeau's plan includes a Five-Power Disarmament Conference, a new Western proposal at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, revitalization of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, emphasis on high level attendance at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in January, and several confidence building measures. All these measures are directed toward improving channels of communication between Washington and Moscow, but Trudeau is seeking to involve other countries, especially Canada's smaller NATO allies and Third World nations and organizations, in the disarmament process.

Since beginning his peace campaign in late October, Trudeau has presented his proposals to the leaders of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Vatican, Italy, West Germany, Great Britain, Japan, China, as well as to a Commonwealth Conference. His personal envoy has briefed Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on the plan in Moscow. Trudeau's initiative has elicited a sympathetic hearing from all quarters but has won no specific commitments. Trudeau professes to be satisfied with the results, but admits that the only consensus he has discovered is a general belief that the superpowers must take the first steps toward disarmament.

Despite the lackluster response, we believe that Trudeau will press forward with his initiative. He has been an outspoken advocate of disarmament for more than 20 years, and his present campaign reflects a personal commitment to arms control. He may also be interested in boosting the popularity of his government and party, but we believe he will persist even if polls show no improvement in the Liberal Party's electoral prospects.

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Trudeau believes that Washington and Moscow each have some responsibility for the recent breakdown of the Geneva talks and thinks that both will have to alter their bargaining position before arms control negotiations can be resumed. We expect, therefore, that in the period before the CDE convenes, Trudeau will try to orchestrate "an elaborate exercise in global public pressure" on Moscow and Washington in an effort to get arms control talks started again.

### Background

Trudeau's current peace initiative probably had its beginnings at the Williamsburg Summit last May

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Following the KAL shootdown on 1 September, Trudeau created a high-level government task force to review existing peace plans and draft a disarmament scheme that he could present when he felt the time was right. The task force apparently finished its work in early October and Trudeau sketched out the resulting plan in a speech on 27 October.

### Major Aspects of Trudeau's Peace Plan

1. Five Power Conference on Limiting Nuclear Weapons - Trudeau believes, according to US Embassy officials, that a conference involving the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and the People's Republic of China should be held to establish fixed ratios -- similar to those created by the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 -- for national strategic forces. Fixed ratios, he argues, would lend overall predictability to the international strategic balance, make it easier to set quantitative ceilings and increase chances for arms reductions. Trudeau views a Five-Power Conference as a complement to INF and START talks. Such a conference would include the following specifics:

#### A. Procedural

- The conference would be preceded by working group consultations to set an agenda, terms of reference, and guidelines.
- Working group meetings would be convened without substantive preconditions.
- The conference would be conducted on a state-to-state and not a bloc-to-bloc basis with each nation retaining a veto over any substantive matter.

B. Substantive

- The conference's overall goal would be to establish "fixed ratios" for the national strategic forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. To accommodate ongoing arms control efforts, the creation of "precise ratios" may have to await the outcome of the INF and START talks.
- To secure superpower agreement, the ratios established by the conference must reflect "de jure equality" of the strategic forces of the US and the USSR.
- The "unit of account" for the conference probably would be "warheads and strategic nuclear vehicles." This would:
  - Correspond to Western and Soviet practice in START and INF.
  - Encourage a move to single warhead systems and prevent countries from placing larger numbers of warheads on launchers to circumvent the agreement.
  - Avoid handicapping the British, French, and Chinese strategic forces which currently have less MIRV potential.
- All parties would be entitled to withdraw from the agreement given adequate notification in situations of perceived threat to their national security
- Qualitative modernization would be allowed if it did not violate the negotiated ratios or subsequent arms control agreements coming out of the START or INF talks.
- Specific numerical totals probably would be attached to the agreed ratios to preclude quantitative increases.
- All land, sea, and air-based systems deemed by the negotiators to be strategic in nature should be included.

- Forces of less than intercontinental range could be deployed wherever the parties desired, subject to restrictions imposed by other arms control agreements. Such an arrangement would force a tradeoff between intercontinental and theater forces. In Trudeau's view, this might dampen incentives for an arms race in the European Theater, while allowing some asymmetries in theater deployments.

2. Conventional Forces - Trudeau proposes a positive and innovative response to the MBFR proposal put forth by the Soviets in June. The West's response, he believes, should be followed by ministerial level talks in Vienna. Trudeau has been vague about the content of the response, but he has expressed interest in the ideas for tradeoffs (data versus verification) recently developed by the West Germans. The Prime Minister apparently does not accept the argument that conventional capabilities will increase as progress is made toward nuclear disarmament. Trudeau recently said in the Canadian Parliament, for example, that the purpose of nuclear disarmament "is not to make the world safe for conventional warfare."

3. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - Trudeau is seeking to add additional signatories to the NPT by creating a strong link between disarmament and development aid to the Third World. This follows the lead taken earlier this year by French President Mitterrand who suggested that the resources saved through disarmament should be directed toward providing economic aid to the Third World.

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4. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) - Trudeau views the CDE scheduled to begin in January in Stockholm as an important first step in creating an atmosphere conducive to disarmament in Europe. The Canadian position at the CDE probably will focus on promoting the full implementation of the confidence building measures NATO has agreed to sponsor.

5. Confidence Building Measures - Trudeau is advocating a ban on high altitude anti-satellite systems because they could be used to attack global communications essential for crisis management. He also is seeking an agreement to improve verifiability by limiting the mobility of present ICBMs and requiring all future weapons systems to be fully verifiable by national technical means.

### International Reactions to Trudeau's Initiative

Since his speech in October, Trudeau has carried this plan to the leaders of six West European nations, Pope John Paul II, the Commonwealth Conference in New Dehli, and top Chinese leaders in Beijing. In addition, Trudeau's personal disarmament envoy, Geoffrey Pearson, has discussed the plan with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow.

Although Trudeau has attempted to put the best face possible on the reactions, he and his aides have been extremely closed-mouthed about the details of discussions to date. US Embassy and media reporting from the various capitals indicates that, in general, Trudeau was politely received but the leaders avoided a commitment to his plan.

#### France

President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Cheysson, although critical of the initiative's timing, volunteered moral support for Trudeau's plan but did not endorse any of its specifics. The French did indicate they might consider attending Five-Power "discussions" to explore the idea of a formal conference. Mitterrand also repeated his previously stated conditions for French attendance at a formal conference.

#### Netherlands

Prime Minister Lubbers supported the thrust of Trudeau's plan, but urged him not to concentrate on the Five-Power Conference idea. Lubbers advised Trudeau to focus instead on "improving the climate in the conventional arms field" by stressing the importance of a new MBFR proposal.

#### Belgium

The Belgians were the most enthusiastic West European supporters of Trudeau's initiative. Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans said his government was "extremely pleased" by the effort and described Trudeau's plan as "the best means" the West now has for reopening a serious dialogue with Moscow.

#### Italy and the Vatican

Prime Minister Craxi apparently was the least forthcoming of the West Europeans and did little more than listen politely. According to US officials, Craxi and Foreign Minister Andreotti regarded the Canadian proposals as "unrealistic" but welcomed Trudeau's effort to reestablish dialogue between the superpowers. Pope John Paul II, on the other hand, wholeheartedly endorsed Trudeau's effort.

West Germany Chancellor Kohl reportedly showed considerable interest in Trudeau's ideas. Canadian Defense Minister Blais recently told US officials that Trudeau was pleased by Kohl's receptiveness, and the New York Times reported that the Chancellor's security advisers are actively studying the plan.

Great Britain Prime Minister Thatcher gave Trudeau's plan a lukewarm reception and told him the idea of a Five-Power Conference was premature. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials apparently were more receptive and Mrs. Thatcher also seemed a bit more supportive of the Canadian initiative at the Commonwealth Conference. "Increased contact," Thatcher said regarding Trudeau's plan, "does not of itself guarantee results, much less quick results. But it can ward off the worst dangers and for that reason alone is worth pursuing."

Japan Prime Minister Nakasone welcomed Trudeau's efforts and said that Japan would unequivocally support his ideas regarding the NPT. Nakasone was non-committal on the other aspects of the Canadian plan.

Commonwealth Conference The Conference's final communique gave general support to Trudeau's plan but refrained from endorsing the specifics. Prime Minister Gandhi of India led those Commonwealth nations opposing Trudeau's plan to expand the number of NPT signatories.

China Trudeau received a polite reception in Beijing but little specific support from the top leaders.

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USSR Trudeau's personal envoy received some limited encouragement from Gromyko, Korniyenko, and Arbatov. He told the Soviets that Trudeau would discuss the plan only with Andropov, and Gromyko hinted that a response regarding such a meeting might be forthcoming by 20 December. Subsequently, Izvestiya political commentator Aleksandr Bovin wrote in the Toronto Star that Moscow supports Trudeau's plan and is "ready for an exchange of opinion at the forum of the five."

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### Canadian Domestic Reaction

At home, Trudeau has received substantial approval for his initiative. Some press articles have accused him of using the peace plan as a ploy to revive the Liberal Party's flagging political fortunes -- the Liberals trailed the Progressive Conservatives by 29 percentage points in a Gallup Poll in October. On the whole, however, Trudeau's recent efforts have been applauded by the public, the media, and the leaders of both opposition parties. According to US officials, Trudeau apparently has struck a responsive chord among Canadians by reminding them of the "golden age" of Canadian diplomacy, the period during the 1950s and 1960s when Canada, as a leading middle power, played the role of "helpful fixer" in such international disputes as the Suez Crisis.

Trudeau's initiative apparently also reflects the concerns of a substantial portion of the Canadian electorate. The Progressive Conservative Party's pollster, Allan Gregg, said recent polls show that an unprecedented proportion of the Canadian population has put the status of international affairs at the top of their list of worries. Gregg estimates that in his next poll 20 to 25 percent of Canadians will list international relations as their top concern; the previous Canadian peak in this category was 11 percent in December 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, the Toronto Globe and Mail has quoted polls showing that among citizens of all the Western countries Canadians are the most fearful about world peace and that their confidence in Washington's ability to deal with world affairs has declined in recent years. Paradoxically, however, a recent poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of International Relations showed that while a majority of Canadians supported the current thrust of the Liberal government's external policy, they still intend to vote for the Progressive Conservatives in the next election.

We believe that Trudeau's initiative is not primarily an attempt to find a way to remain party leader and prime minister. Trudeau has been an outspoken advocate of disarmament for more than 20 years and, in our judgment, his present effort is inspired predominantly by intellectual commitment rather than political pragmatism. Some slow, or even sporadic, progress toward the reopening of a positive US-USSR arms control dialogue may, however, encourage Trudeau to seek reelection in the general election now expected in the fall of 1984. Trudeau pledged, in 1980, to retire before the next election.

Next Steps in the Initiative

In our opinion, Trudeau will in the near future seek to put increased public pressure on Washington and Moscow to renew and expand arms control negotiations. Such pressure might include the following specific moves:

- Take an activist position within the NATO caucus at the CDE in Stockholm. We believe that the Canadians will be very active within the NATO caucus and most unwilling to back away from any of the confidence building measures it now plans to introduce. Both Trudeau and External Affairs Minister MacEachen have stressed the importance they attach to the CDE and we cannot rule out the possibility that the Canadians may urge the caucus to make additional substantive recommendations should the conference appear headed for a stalemate
- Seek to restart the MBFR talks. We believe that Canada may suggest that a ministerial level meeting be held in Vienna as a means of getting MBFR talks started again. Trudeau believes that a high-level "political impulse" is needed to improve the prospects for an MBFR agreement; he has described those talks to date as "a silent exercise in which the technocrats were in control."
- "Fundamental debate" in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on NATO's dual track policy and force structure. During his recent visit to Japan, Trudeau told Nakasone that, while Canada remained committed to NATO's dual track policy, INF "had failed" and that the alliance had "crossed a dangerous threshold" with deployment. Trudeau also told the Dutch that he is skeptical, even cynical, about the ability of the other NATO allies to influence US policy and that he believes the deterrent side of the dual track policy now far overshadows the negotiating. We believe he may seek common ground with the smaller NATO allies before urging debate in the NAC.
- Seek additional moral support for his initiative from Third World nations. Trudeau has indicated that he may seek the support of the G-77 group of non-aligned nations in the United Nations to complement the general support he received at the Commonwealth Conference. He also will continue to urge the LDCs who have not signed the NPT to do so.



- Increased public emphasis on confidence building measures, especially a ban on ASAT. In a speech in 1978, Trudeau called for the "suffocation" of the nuclear arms race through the halting of "the technological momentum ... freezing at the initial, testing stage the development of any new weapons system." We believe that Trudeau's call for a ban on high altitude anti-satellite systems, for limits on ICBM mobility, and for verifiable weapons systems fits within the framework of his "suffocation" plan and that he will push hard for their adoption.

Chronology of Trudeau's Peace Initiative, September-December 1983

- Early Sep 83 - Trudeau establishes a government task force on disarmament with members drawn from the Prime Minister's Office, the Department of External Affairs, and the Department of National Defense.
- 1 Oct 83 - The Prime Minister briefs UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on his intention to begin a peace initiative.
- 17 Oct 83 - Canadian External Affairs Minister MacEachen outlines Trudeau's initiative to the US Secretary of State during a bilateral meeting in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
- 20 Oct 83 - Canadian Government allocates increased funding for research and development of weapons verification technology and creates an Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Program in the Department of External Affairs.
- MacEachen's statement for UN Disarmament Week announces Canada's intention to become more fully involved in the international disarmament process.
- 23 Oct 83 - Trudeau holds private discussions with former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in Ottawa.
- 24 Oct 83 - In Parliament, Trudeau rejects inclusion of British and French strategic systems in the INF talks in Geneva, but reasserts his belief that both systems must be included eventually in an overall arms agreement.
- 25 Oct 83 - Trudeau sends a letter to President Reagan describing his intention to begin a disarmament initiative and outlining its objectives.
- Trudeau circulates a letter to all NATO heads of government broadly outlining his intentions.
- 27 Oct 83 - The Prime Minister officially launches his initiative in a speech to a Disarmament Conference at Guelph University in Ontario. He recommends a Five-Power Disarmament Conference, a Conference on Disarmament in Europe in January 1984, a ban on anti-satellite systems, limits on ICBM mobility, a campaign to add signatories to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and a new Western proposal at the MBFR talks.

- 28 Oct 83 - Trudeau delivers a speech at Dalhousie University's fall convocation in which he describes his initiative as an exercise in "creative radicalism."
- 29 Oct 83 - Trudeau meets with heads of the Harvard University Nuclear Study Group in New York. His effort is reported to have been prompted, in part, by the conclusions of the Study Group's book Living with Nuclear Weapons.
- 6 Nov 83 - Trudeau sends a letter to Soviet leader Andropov outlining his initiative.
- 8 Nov 83 - Trudeau discusses his plans with President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Cheysson in Paris and with Prime Minister Lubbers in The Hague.
- 9-10 Nov 83 - Trudeau presents his plan to Prime Minister Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans in Brussels, to Pope John Paul II in the Vatican, and Prime Minister Craxi and Foreign Minister Andreotti in Rome.
- 10 Nov 83 - Trudeau presents his plan to Chancellor Kohl in Bonn.
- Canadian Deputy Minister for Foreign Policy Marchand briefs US Deputy Secretary of State in Washington on the progress of Trudeau's initiative.
- 11 Nov 83 - The Prime Minister describes his proposals to Prime Minister Thatcher in London. London was not scheduled in Trudeau's original itinerary but was added at Mrs. Thatcher's request.
- 13 Nov 83 - Trudeau makes a speech in Montreal depicting the "consensus of support" he found in Western Europe for his plan. Announces the dispatch of Geoffrey Pearson, a Canadian diplomat and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Beijing and Moscow to broach his plan. Also announces he will visit Tokyo on 19 November to discuss his plan with Prime Minister Nakasone.
- 15 Nov 83 - MacEachen briefs US officials in Ottawa on the status of Trudeau's initiative and recommends early discussion on the topic between the Prime Minister and the President.

- 19 Nov 83 - Trudeau discusses plan with Nakasone in Tokyo.
- He briefs Georgiy Arbatov, head of Moscow's US/Canada Institute, on his initiative. Arbatov had requested the interview through the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo.
- 22 Nov 83 - Canada's Permanent Representative to NATO distributes a background paper describing Trudeau's initiative, and the West European response to it, at a meeting of NATO's Political Committee.
- 23 Nov 83 - Trudeau delivers keynote address at Commonwealth Conference in New Dehli. He appeals for support for his initiative and emphasizes his desire to add signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Endorses President's Mitterrand's desire to link disarmament and Third World development.
- 25 Nov 83 - Trudeau's personal envoy, discusses the initiative with Gromyko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, and Arbatov in Moscow.
- 28-29 Nov 83 - Trudeau discusses his plan with Premier Zhao, Foreign Minister Wu Xuegian, and Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing.
- 29 Nov 83 - MacEachen's speech to Chicago Council on Foreign Relations describes Trudeau's desire to improve the atmosphere between Moscow and Washington by "a political act of high significance."
- 3 Dec 83 - Trudeau announces that the next step in his initiative will be to "put pressure more directly on the super powers." He says that this step was urged on him by each of the world leaders with whom he has spoken.
- 7 Dec 83 - In a statement opening Parliament, the Canadian government reaffirms Canada's intention to "continue to advance proposals to slow the steady spiral of the arms race, halt the spread of nuclear weapons, and create the conditions for greater security at lower levels of armament."
- 9 Dec 83 - MacEachen informs Secretary Shultz in Brussels that Trudeau may raise the possibility of a review of NATO strategy and force structure during his visit to Washington on 15 December. [REDACTED]

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